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An Analysis on Borrowing Behavior of Rural Households 
in Vientiane Municipality: Case Study of Four Villages
Chansathith Chaleunsinh,* Ohno Akihiko,** Fujita Koichi,*** and  
Mieno Fumiharu***
Since the late 1990s the savings groups have been introduced in the villages of Laos. 
This movement has offered new borrowing opportunities for the rural people.  Based 
on household survey using a structured questionnaire in four study villages (N=684) 
in Vientiane Municipality during 2007–08 we analyzed the role and performance of 
the savings group in rural financial markets, especially focusing on who borrows, 
from which sources, and for what purposes by comparing the savings group with 
informal and formal lenders.  Two major findings are as follows.  First, three types 
of lenders (savings groups, formal and informal lenders) have their own particular 
features, and thereby loan purposes differ significantly.  Formal banks offer loans 
exclusively for production purposes, while informal lenders do for coping with emer-
gencies.  Savings groups fall between them.  Second, though poor households are 
reluctant to be a savings group member, once they participate in they actively obtain 
loans from it.  In contrast, though rich households actively participate in the group, 
they obtain loans less from it.  Group members claim that the primary purpose of 
joining the savings group is to cope with emergencies.  When the members obtain 
loans from the savings group, however, nearly 40% of the loans are used for produc-
tion purposes, mainly in agriculture.  There exists a change between saving pur-
poses and borrowing ones.  It is assumed that in villages with the higher loan credit 
for production purposes, the savings groups show favorable performance, and thus 
a rapid growth.
Keywords: Laos, savings groups, credit demand, precipitation incentive,  
household behavior
* ຈນັສະຖດິ ຈະເລີນສນິ, National Economic Research Institute, 5th Floor, New MPI Building, 
Souphanouvong Avenue, Vientiane Capital 01001, Lao PDR
 Corresponding Author’s e-mail: chansathit@hotmail.com
** 大野昭彦, School of International Politics, Economic and Communication, Aoyama Gakuin 
University, 4-4-25 Shibuya Shibuya-ku, Tokyo 150-8366, Japan
*** 藤田幸一; 三重野文晴, Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University, 46 
 Shimoadachi-cho, Yoshida Sakyo-ku, Kyoto 606-8501, Japan
Chansathith Chaleunsinh et al.114
I Introduction
Since the late 1990s the savings groups (hereafter SG) have been introduced in the rural 
areas of Laos (Coleman and Wynne 2006), starting from the villages in Vientiane Munic-
ipality.  In Laos rural people find it difficult to access formal financial markets.  Though 
the Agricultural Promotion Bank (APB) is almost a sole formal financial institution for 
rural people, its branch network is poorly established.  Thus, rural people rely on informal 
lenders such as relatives, friends, moneylenders, and so forth for loans.  By the time of 
our survey the SG has been established in almost all the villages in Vientiane Municipal-
ity.  Thus, the SG turns out a vital lender for rural people.
Some important questions arise as to who participate in the SG, who actually borrow, 
and for what purposes they borrow.  In addition, we need to examine who participate in 
the SG and if the group substitutes for formal and informal lenders.
The emergence of SGs is a recent phenomenon (Ledgerwood 1999; Robinson 2001). 
The financial system has several forms of cooperative financial institutions called as credit 
unions, savings and loan cooperatives, village banks, self-help groups, and so forth.  SGs 
are community-based credit and savings association established to provide access to 
savings and loan services in rural areas.  However, only few research attempts have so 
far been made at SGs in developing countries (Gingrich 2004; Papias and Ganesan 2009; 
Cheruiyot et al. 2012).  Furthermore, these studies do not explore the above research 
questions.
In order to examine such a series of questions, we selected four villages in Vientiane 
Municipality and conducted a detailed household-level survey in 2007–08 using a struc-
tured questionnaire (N=684).  The Vientiane plain that covers Vientiane Municipality is 
a major rice producing area in Laos.  In the Plain there exist two types of village, rice 
producing villages and villages engaging in rural non-farm activities, of which most well-
known is hand-weaving cottage industry.  Thus, we selected two agriculturally advanced 
villages especially in rice cultivation (paddy villages) and two villages with active hand-
weaving cottage industry (hand-weaving villages) to explore how different village char-
acteristics affect the role and performance of the three rural lenders: SGs, formal banks, 
and informal lenders.
The remaining part of this paper is organized as follows.  In section 2, we present 
basic characteristics of the study villages and of 684 surveyed households.  The house-
holds are classified into three economic classes; poor, middle, and rich, based on the 
holdings of major consumer durables and the amount of gold held.  In section 3, we 
proceed to analyze the performance of the SGs and other rural financial markets in the 
villages.  Section 4 discusses who borrow from which sources, and for what purposes. 
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In addition, we examine who participate in an SG.  Finally, in section 5 we conclude.
II Characteristics of the Study Villages and Households
The locations of our study villages (ban) are shown in Fig. 1 with traveling hours by 
motorcycle from the center of Vientiane city.  As road condition to Thanasa and Natan is 
not favorable, vehicles take more time to reach the villages in the rainy season.  The two 
paddy villages (Thanasa and Don Neua), located along the Mekong River, are agricultur-
ally advanced, especially in rice production.  In contrast, other two weaving villages 
(Natan and Phon Ngam) are agriculturally backward, whereas the hand-weaving cottage 
industry is thriving.
The history of Don Neua dates back to the early seventeenth century.  Phon Ngam 
was established only in 1969 by the migrants (Tai-dam ethnic) from Xieng Khuang Prov-
ince.  The other two villages have roughly 100 years of history.  Natan started in 1917 
when people (Tai-puan ethnic) migrated from Xam Neua Province due to inter-ethnic 
conflicts.  Thanasa started from 15 households more than 100 years ago when people 
(Tai-puan ethnic) migrated from somewhere between the two provinces of Xieng Khuang 
and Vientiane.
In 2007 and 2008, by using a semi-structured questionnaire we conducted a house-
hold census survey in these villages (N=684), although a few households could not be 
Fig. 1 Location of the Study Villages
Source: The National Geographic Department (NGD).
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covered for various reasons.  Table 1 demonstrates the basic structure of income earnings 
of the surveyed households in the four villages.  Major notable findings are summarized 
as follows.
First, most households in Thanasa and Don Neua of the paddy zone are self-sufficient 
in rice, whereas 18–25% of households need to purchase rice in the two weaving villages. 
Note also that compared to Don Neua, Thanasa has much more marketable surplus of 
rice, with more than 85% of households selling rice in the market.
Second, Phon Ngam scores the highest average household cash income (nearly 25 
million kip per annum, approximately US$2,500), followed by Thanasa and Don Neua at 
around 17–18 million kip, and the lowest is recorded by Natan at slightly more than 10 
million kip.1)
Third, the sources of cash income differ substantially among the four villages. 
Dependency on agriculture (including livestock) is already low even in the two agricul-
turally advanced villages (45.9% and 30.8% in Thanasa and Don Neua respectively, and 
36.4% and 19.6% in Natan and Phon Ngam respectively).  The share of income from 
hand-weaving is high in Natan and Phon Ngam, whereas the share of income from “other 
business” (business other than hand-weaving) is high in Thanasa and Don Neua.  Other 
notable facts are that salary income is important for Phon Ngam and that remittance is 
important for Don Neua.2)
Table 2 shows the status of major non-land assets holding among the households. 
Cattle mainly for meat are the most important livestock.  It is found that motorcycles, 
TVs, refrigerators, and phones reach more than 70% penetration rates.  Gold is an impor-
tant form of savings for the villagers, along with livestock.
Let us classify the households based on the ownership of consumer durables and 
gold (as shown in Table 2) into three classes; poor, middle, and rich (Table 3).3)  Note 
that whereas middle class households occupy 46–54% of the households in the four vil-
1) Note that the average household cash income in the eight villages studied by authors in Luang 
Prabang Province in 2010 and 2011 is as follows; 52 million kip in Xieng Lek, 16 million kip in Sop 
Houn, 10 million kip in Kogneiw, 6.0 million kip in Sop Khon, 5.2 million kip in Had Sao, 4.1 million 
kip in Houei Hoi, 3.7 million kip in Sop Khan, and 2.4 million kip in Had Chan (see Table 6 in Fujita, 
Ohno, and Chansathith, the second paper in this special issue).  Although Natan is the poorest among 
the four villages, it is relatively wealthy compared to the villages in Luang Prabang Province.
2) After the social revolution in 1975 many villagers fled to abroad especially USA from Don Neua, 
which causes a high remittance income in the village.
3) The classification method applied is a bit arbitrary; i.e., we took up seven consumer durables as car, 
motorbike, bicycle, television set, refrigerator, telephone, and power connection and if a household 
has more than six items or five items plus more than two baat of gold, it is classified into the “rich” 
whereas if a household has less than three items (except for car and motorbike) it is classified into 
the “poor.”  However, even if a bit arbitrary, by and large it seems quite reasonable when looking 
at the other economic indicators for the three class categories (see Table 4).
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lages, the share of poor households is larger (29–30%) in Natan and Thanasa and that of 
rich households is larger (36%) in Phon Ngam and Don Neua.  Average family size is the 
smallest in the poor, followed by the middle and the rich.  This indicates that family cycle 
may at least partly concern the disparity.  The largest household size of 5.76 is recorded 
in Phon Ngam and the smallest size of 4.52 in Thanasa.  Thus, nuclear family is said to 
be the rule in Lao villages.
Tables 4 and 5 summarize the major economic indicators by the three economic 
classes.  Several notable points are as follows.  First, economic disparity as to household 
cash income is relatively small in Natan and Don Neua, while it is large in Phon Ngam 
and Thanasa.  Natan is relatively egalitarian in terms of income distribution between the 
poor and the rich, though having a large share of the poor; Phon Ngam is inequitable in 
terms of income distribution, with a large share of the rich; Thanasa is inequitable in 
terms of income distribution, with a large share of the poor; and Don Neua is egalitarian 
in terms of income distribution, with a large share of the rich.
Table 3 Economic Classes and Population
No. of 
HHs Share
No. of Population per HH
Male Female Total
Natan
Poor 51 29.1% 2.27 2.37 4.64
Middle 94 53.7% 2.81 2.69 5.50
Rich 30 17.1% 2.43 2.67 5.10
Total 175 100% 2.59 2.59 5.18
Phon Ngam
Poor 32 18.9% 2.59 2.56 5.15
Middle 77 45.6% 2.90 2.61 5.51
Rich 60 35.5% 3.13 3.28 6.41
Total 169 100% 2.92 2.84 5.76
Thanasa
Poor 60 29.7% 1.87 2.12 3.99
Middle 102 50.5% 2.28 2.30 4.58
Rich 40 19.8% 2.60 2.55 5.15
Total 202 100% 2.22 2.30 4.52
Don Neua
Poor 19 13.8% 2.11 1.95 4.06
Middle 69 50.0% 2.32 2.19 4.51
Rich 50 36.2% 2.46 2.60 5.06
Total 138 100% 2.34 2.31 4.65
Total
Poor 162 23.7% 2.17 2.27 4.43
Middle 342 50.0% 2.57 2.45 5.03
Rich 180 26.3% 2.71 2.83 5.54
Total 684 100% 2.51 2.51 5.02
Source: Prepared by authors.
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Second, the share of hand-weaving income in total household cash income is the 
highest for the poor both in Natan and Phon Ngam.  It is evident that the development 
of the hand-weaving cottage industry in Laos is induced by poverty among the poorer 
households in agriculturally backward villages.4)
Third, in the two villages of paddy zone the share of agricultural wage income 
(including other miscellaneous incomes) is the highest for the poor.  This implies that 
agricultural development alleviates poverty through the agricultural labor market.
Fourth, business income (other than hand-weaving) is a major cause of income 
disparity among the three classes in the study villages, especially in the agriculturally 
advanced villages of Thanasa and Don Neua.
III The Savings Groups and the Rural Financial Markets in the Study 
Villages
The SGs were introduced to the four villages almost simultaneously in the early 2000s; 
firstly in Don Neua in 2000, followed by in Phon Ngam in 2001 and finally in Natan and 
Thanasa in 2003.  However, they show different growth pathways (Table 6).  Don Neua 
achieves the most rapid development, with almost 100% of household participation in SG 
and 3.74 members per household on average.5)  Thanasa SG records nearly 80% of house-
hold participation, although per household members is only 1.74.  In contrast, the two 
“hand-weaving villages,” the household participation rate is short of 50%, in spite of the 
relatively high per household members, especially in the case of Natan.
On the other hand, the table clearly shows among the four villages that the propor-
tion of membership is the lowest for the poor and that the number of group members per 
member household is the smallest for the poor.
Table 7 demonstrates the borrowing behaviors of the households by the three eco-
nomic classes; if a household borrowed money from at least one of sources (either from 
the SG, formal banks, or informal lenders) during the two year period prior to our survey, 
it is classified as a “borrower.”  The sources of loans are shown in the table.  The first 
table is for all the households; the second one is for SG members; and the third one is 
for non-members.
There are several points to be noted here.  First, overall, 50% of the households are 
borrowers, ranging from 31% in Phon Ngam to 67% in Thanasa.  Usually, non-SG mem-
4) For the hand-weaving cottage industry in Laos, refer to Ohno (2001; 2009).
5) For more information, see Fujita, the sixth paper in this special issue.
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ber households record a significantly lower incidence of borrowing (vis-à-vis SG mem-
bers) at only 15% on average, except for the case of Thanasa at 40%.  In other words, 
those who intend to borrow are likely to be SG members.
Second, among the SG households the rich show the lowest incidence of borrowing 
from the SG.  In contrast, though the participation rate in an SG is the lowest for the poor, 
they turn out active borrowers once they participate in an SG.  This means that an SG 
functions as a financial intermediary between the cash-surplus rich to the cash-deficit 
poor.
Third, borrowings from formal banks are mainly observed in agriculturally advanced 
zone, Thanasa and Don Neua.  This is mainly because the APB is almost the sole insti-
tutional lender in rural Laos, which extends loans only for agricultural purposes.











per HHNumber Share (%)
Natan
Poor 51 29.1 16 31.4 20 1.25
Middle 94 53.7 50 53.2 104 2.08
Rich 30 17.1 18 60.0 42 2.33
Total 175 100 84 48.0 166 1.98
Phon Ngam
Poor 32 18.9 12 37.5 18 1.50
Middle 77 45.6 35 45.5 56 1.60
Rich 60 35.5 30 50.0 53 1.77
Total 169 100 77 45.6 127 1.65
Thanasa
Poor 60 29.7 38 63.3 58 1.53
Middle 102 50.5 85 83.3 159 1.87
Rich 40 19.8 34 85.0 56 1.65
Total 202 100 157 77.7 273 1.74
Don Neua
Poor 19 13.8 18 94.7 52 2.89
Middle 69 50.0 69 100.0 244 3.54
Rich 50 36.2 50 100.0 217 4.34
Total 138 100 137 99.3 513 3.74
Total
Poor 162 23.7 84 51.9 148 1.76
Middle 342 50.0 239 69.9 563 2.36
Rich 180 26.3 132 73.3 368 2.79
Total 684 100 455 66.5 1,079 2.37
Source: Prepared by authors.
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Poor 51 38 13 25.5 8 3 1 1
Middle 94 51 43 45.7 34 3 2 3 1
Rich 30 15 15 50.0 9 1 4 1
Total 175 104 71 40.6 51 1 10 3 5 1
Phon Ngam
Poor 32 22 10 31.3 6 4
Middle 77 51 26 33.8 15 1 5 1 3 1
Rich 60 43 17 28.3 14 1 1 1
Total 169 116 53 31.4 35 1 10 2 4 1
Thanasa
Poor 60 22 38 63.3 19 1 8 6 3 1
Middle 102 28 74 72.5 41 4 3 19 6 1
Rich 40 17 23 57.5 9 5 1 7 1
Total 202 67 135 66.8 69 10 12 32 10 2
Don Neua
Poor 19 4 15 78.9 9 1 1 3 1
Middle 69 23 46 66.7 24 3 3 11 3 2
Rich 50 26 24 48.0 11 3 1 4 4 1
Total 138 53 85 61.6 44 7 4 16 10 4
Total
Poor 162 86 76 46.9 42 2 15 8 7 1 1
Middle 342 153 189 55.3 114 8 14 33 15 1 4
Rich 180 101 79 43.9 43 9 7 12 7 1
Total 684 340 344 50.3 199 19 36 53 29 2 6




















Poor 16 6 10 62.5 8 1 1
Middle 50 9 41 82.0 34 1 2 3 1
Rich 18 7 11 61.1 9 2
Total 84 22 62 73.8 51 3 3 4 1
Phon Ngam
Poor 12 4 8 66.7 6 2
Middle 35 14 21 60.0 14 1 1 1 3 1
Rich 30 13 17 56.7 14 1 1 1
Total 77 31 46 59.7 34 1 4 2 4 1
Thanasa
Poor 38 10 28 73.7 19 6 2 1
Middle 85 16 69 81.2 41 2 1 19 6
Rich 34 14 20 58.8 9 2 1 7 1
Total 157 40 117 74.5 69 4 2 32 9 1
Don Neua
Poor 18 3 15 83.3 9 1 1 3 1
Middle 69 23 46 66.7 24 3 3 11 3 2
Rich 50 26 24 48.0 11 3 1 4 4 1
Total 137 52 85 62.0 44 7 4 16 10 4
Total
Poor 84 23 61 72.6 42 1 2 8 6 1 1
Middle 239 62 177 74.1 113 6 6 33 15 4
Rich 132 60 72 54.5 43 5 5 12 6 1
Total 455 145 310 68.1 198 12 13 53 27 1 6




















Poor 35 32 3 8.6 3
Middle 44 42 2 4.5 2
Rich 12 8 4 33.3 1 2 1
Total 91 82 9 9.9 1 7 1
Phon Ngam
Poor 20 18 2 10.0 2
Middle 42 37 5 11.9 1 4
Rich 30 30 0 0
Total 92 85 7 7.6 1 6
Thanasa
Poor 22 12 10 45.5 1 8 1
Middle 17 12 5 29.4 2 2 1
Rich 6 3 3 50.0 3
Total 45 27 18 40.0 6 10 1 1
Don Neua
Poor 1 1 0 0
Middle 0 0 0
Rich 0 0 0
Total 1 1 0 0
Total
Poor 78 63 15 19.2 1 13 1
Middle 103 91 12 11.7 1 2 8 1
Rich 48 41 7 14.6 4 2 1
Total 229 195 34 14.8 1 7 23 2 1
Source: Prepared by authors.
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IV The Determinants of a Household Decision on Borrowing
In this section we propose a binary probit model to estimate a household’s decision of 
whether or not to obtain loans from three types of lenders: SGs, a formal bank, and 
informal lenders.  As these three financial sources have their own features, different loan 
functions are expected.  Thus, we estimate two types of a loan borrowing function: (a) a 
general function that deals with loans from at least one of the lenders, and (b) a borrow-
ing function from a respective lender: loans from an SG, a formal bank, and an informal 
lender.  Each function is displayed using (1) entire sample, (2) the paddy zone sample, 
and (3) the weaving zone sample.  However, a function for a formal bank is estimated 
only for the paddy zone, because only a few households borrow from a bank in the weav-
ing zone.
The borrowing function we estimate is,
Bij = αXij + βZij + γAij + δSij + ζYij + ηZij + μij ,
where Bij stands for borrowing experience of ith household from a lender j, which equals 
1 if the household has borrowed money from any lenders at least once in the past two 
years.  X is vector measuring household’s characteristics that include age and educational 
attainments of household head, wealth levels, family size, SG membership.  Z represents 
paddy production characteristics that include planted area for paddy and expenditure for 
chemical fertilizer.  A denotes social capital gauged by a question: If you suddenly needed 
a substantial amount of money (say, one million kip [approximately US$100]), how many 
people in the village could you turn to? (less than 3=1, 3 to 5=2, 6 to 8=4, more than 
9=5).  S is a shock dummy measured by a question if the household encountered a shock 
in the past two years (Yes=1, No=0).  Y is per capita annual income from different 
sources.  Z is an area dummy (paddy zone=0, weaving zone=1) and N and D are the 
dummies for Natan and Don Neua respectively.  µ is the error term.  The details of vari-
ables including their summary statistics are reported in Table 8.
The regression coefficients for the above equation are presented in Table 9.  First, 
the results of a general function (columns 1 to 3) indicate that SHOCK is the major 
 reason of loan taking.  Living with various risks, rural households face difficulties in 
managing emergent expenditures on various events.  From another perspective, the 
households having a constant inflow of cash income, WEAVING and SELFEMP, decrease 
the likelihood of obtaining loans.  SALARIED and REMITTANCE also decrease the 
likelihood in the paddy zone.  Remittance is mostly sent from overseas Laotians who fled 
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the country following its communist Pathet Lao takeover as a result of the Laotian Civil 
War in 1975.  The displaced persons were mostly the natives of indigenous villages in 
the Vientiane plain such as Don Neua (Table 1).  Similarly, households in a rich stratum 
of village societies (Rich-D) borrow less.  They are assumed to be able to self-finance 
emergencies.  A significantly positive coefficient to SG membership (SGM-D) implies 
that SG turns out an additional lender for village households.
As Table 7 shows, the sample households obtain loans from different sources.  Col-
umn 4 of Table 9 presents a borrowing function for a formal bank in the paddy zone. 
Educational attainments significantly increase the likelihood of obtaining a loan from a 
formal bank (mostly APB).  This is possibly because higher educational attainment facil-
itates the procedure for a loan request.  That expenditure for chemical fertilizer (CHEMI) 
has a significantly positive effect on a bank loan is because APB extends loans for agri-
cultural production.  As was observed in Japan (Ohno, the first paper in this special issue), 
increasing application of chemical fertilizer in Laos will necessitate well-established 
financial services for rural households.  It should be noted that SHOCK also lets the 
households obtain loan from APB.  This is mainly because the household having obtained 
loans from informal sources when they experienced emergent expenditure obtained a 
loan from APB to pay off their debt.  This fungibility assumedly appears as a significant 
positive coefficient of SHOCK.  In fact, what we observed in Don Neua during our field 
survey is that some villagers borrowed from informal sources (mainly relatives and 
Table 8 Descriptive Statistics of Variables and Test of Equal Means by Zone
Description Remark Variable Name Total Paddy Weaving t-value
Savings group member Member=1, otherwise=0 SGM-D 0.67 0.86 0.47
Age of household head year AGE 44.62 42.12 47.1 –4.73 ***
Education of household head no education=0 to university=5 ED 2.62 2.43 2.81 4.19 ***
Poor household Poor household=1, otherwise=0 POOR-D 0.23 0.23 0.24 –0.46
Rich household Rich household=1, otherwise=0 RICH-D 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.09
Household size HHSIZE 5.02 4.57 5.46 –6.16 ***
Paddy land in ha PADDYHA 1.31 1.42 1.19 1.81
Expenditure for chemical fertilizer kip CHEMI 216,011 199,075 232,750 –0.95
Reciprocal social capital see, main text KIN 0.38 0.31 0.45 –3.94 ***
Previous expenditure shock see, main text SHOCK 0.27 0.3 0.25 1.64
Cash Income from kip
paddy sales PADDY 3,085,139 4,407,118 1,778,531 5.34 ***
agriculture other than paddy OTHERAGRI 621,671 519,597 7,225,580 –0.84
livestock sales LIVESTOCK 1,937,063 2,100,850 1,775,180 0.8
hand weaving WEAVING 1,528,850 63,085 2,977,572 –11.17 ***
self-employed business SELFEMP 3,770,668 4,833,058 2,720,631 1.71
salaried occupation SALARIED 2,769,342 2,127,224 3,403,394 –2.49 **
remittance REMITTANCE 917,902 1,159,441 679,171 1.73
agricultural wage AGRIWAGE 1,803,854 2,382,650 1,231,787 3.47 ***
Gold Gold ownership in baat (local unit of gold) GOLD 0.67 0.69 0.66 0.65
Note: *** P<1%, ** P<5%.
t-value is for the difference between paddy villages and weaving villages.
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friends, and in some cases from moneylenders) when they faced emergencies, and after 
some time they borrowed from APB to repay the debt.  In such cases, SHOCK induces 
villagers to borrow from formal banks, with a certain time lag.
Informal loan functions are shown in columns 5 to 7 of Table 9.  The results indicate 
that SHOCK is a major reason of borrowing from informal lenders; on an average 62.3% 
are from relatives, 18.2% from neighbors and friends, and 11.7% from money lenders in 
the four study villages.  Informal lenders offer convenient loans due to their swift pro-
cedure when rural households face emergencies.  It is noted that in the paddy zone SGs 
are substituting for informal lenders.  This will be discussed later as a difference between 
saving motive and borrowing purposes.
Columns 8 to 10 show borrowing functions for SGs (sample households are group 
members only).  A constant inflow of cash income, SELFEMP and SALARIED, deceases 
the likelihood of a loan taking from SGs in the paddy zone.  Pecuniary enough, SHOCK 
does not account for loans from SGs.  This is probably because an urgent loan demand 
cannot be satisfied by SGs.  SG loan is disbursed once a month on the fixed day, and group 
members who have a debt to repay cannot obtain a loan from SGs even if they faced 
shocks.  In this respect, informal lenders are assumed to still offer most convenient loans 
against shocks that involve urgent expenditures.
In whole, especially for the weaving zone, SG borrowing functions are rather blurred. 
A major motivation to participate in an SG is for precautionary savings followed by edu-
cation expenditure (Table 10).  However, when it comes to loan usages (Table 11), though 
coping with shock (disease and other emergencies) is a major reason of loan usage that 
accounts for 24.5% of loan obtained, nearly 40% of loan is spent for production pur-
poses including education.  Another usage (16%) goes for consumption purposes.  Unlike 
production- specific loans from APB, the usage of loan form SG is diversified.  As the SG 
Table 10 Reasons to Participate in Savings Group
(%)
Entire Sample Paddy Zone Weaving Zone
Emergency 72.5 73.6 71.8
Education 11.9 10.4 12.7
To prepare for old age 5.7 7.4 4.5
Future consumption 0.2 0.6 0
To gain dividend 4.0 4.3 3.8
Not to waste expenditure 4.0 3.1 4.5
Agricultural purpose 1.1 0 1.7
Others 0.6 0 1.0
Total 100.0 99.4 100
Source: Prepared by authors.
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is a savings-first financial institution, borrowers tend to perceive the loans from an SG 
as withdrawal of own savings.  Thus, purpose-specific loans cannot be bound to borrow-
ers for the SG.  This is likely to blur the SG borrowing function.
Tables 10 and 11 indicate that the motive of savings does not match the actual usage 
of loans.  Though precautionary savings characterize saving behavior of rural households, 
they utilize sizeable amount of their loans for production purposes.  Though this is a 
natural process of savings accumulation, it implies that growth prospects of the SG largely 
depend on loan demands for production purposes.  Otherwise, as discussed in several 
articles of this special issue, emerging surplus money is concerned to jeopardize the SG 
movement of Laos.
The question that needs to be taken up next is who participate in the SG.  Table 12 
presents an SG participation function.  The poor segment of the village households does 
not participate in an SG.  They find it difficult to save every month, because SGs require 
members to save at least 5,000 to 10,000 kip every month.  A shock experience has the 
effect of encouraging participation in the SG.  As a rule, members are entitled to access 
loan after saving more than three months.  Thus, transitory shock itself does not explain 
the participation in the SGs.  It can be assumed that shock-prone households tend to 
participate in an SG.
It should be noted that income from livestock sales is negatively associated with 
participation in the SG.  Table 13 shows the allocation of lump-sum income (one million 
kip); the question is that “Suppose you get one million kip, how do you allocate the money 
Table 11 Usage of Loan from Savings Group
(%)
Entire Sample Paddy Zone Weaving Zone
Disease 18.8 18.1 20.0
Emergency other than disease 5.7 3.3 10.0
Production purposes (39.3) (44.9) (29.1)
Paddy planting 9.9 13.7 3.0
Chemical fertilizer 2.1 2.2 2.0
Paddy harvesting 2.8 4.4 0
Other agriculture 16.0 20.3 8.0
Livestock 1.8 2.7 0
Education 6.7 1.6 16.0
Consumption 16.0 14.2 19.0
Child birth 0.7 0.5 1.0
Ceremony 2.1 1.1 4.0
Others 17.4 17.9 17.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Prepared by authors.
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among the followings (choices are shown in the table).”  Respondents have little intention 
to save the money in a formal bank, because they do not have ready access to savings 
facilities in formal financial institutions.  Instead, they save one-third of the money in an 
SG.  It should be noted that 17% goes for livestock purchase.  Livestock is known in less 
developed countries like Laos as the most common means of non-cash savings.  Thus, 
households who are endowed with favorable conditions for livestock farming tend not to 
participate in SGs.  Though gold is said to be another means of savings, it does not affect 
participation behavior.  This is partly because gold investment is far smaller than livestock 
investment as can be understood from Table 12.
Our major findings are; 1) Rural households have access to several lenders.  SGs 
turn out to be a prepotent lender.  2) Lenders (SGs, formal bank, and informal lenders) 
Table 12 Savings Group Participation Function
Z-coefficient Wald
Age 0.002 0.133
ED 0.098 3.146 *






Shock 0.394 8.183 ***
Cash income by sources
Paddy –4.04E-09 0.201
OtherAgri 6.12E-09 0.128
Livestock –2.22E-08 3.501 *
Weaving 1.14E-08 0.554
Non-farm self employment 4.03E-10 0.008
Salaried –9.68E-09 1.046
Remittance 2.47E-08 1.044
Agri. Wages and others 6.78E-09 0.196
Gold 0.018 0.016
N –0.947 30.98 ***
P –1.173 39.836 ***
N (%) 546 (100.0)
Member 318 (58.2)
Non-member 228 (41.8)




Note: *** P<1%, * P<10%.
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have their own peculiarities in that formal banks extend loans for production purposes, 
informal lenders for coping with shocks.  The SG falls between them.  SG members bor-
row money to cope with shocks as well as for production purposes, and even for a con-
sumption purpose.
V Concluding Remarks
Our major objective is to discuss how the SG functions in the villages of Vientiane Munic-
ipality, based on the case studies in four villages.  We selected two “weaving villages” 
and two “paddy villages” in order to assess the differential performance and impact of 
the SGs between them.  Our focus is to clarify who borrow, from which sources, and for 
what purposes.  In order to deepen the analysis we classified the households into three 
economic classes; poor, middle, and rich.
The major findings and conclusions are summarized as below.  First, the poor are 
less likely to participate in an SG.  This is partly because the poor are too poor to afford 
monthly commitment savings of at least 5,000–10,000 kip (roughly US$0.5–1).  Another 
plausible reason is an emotional barrier in participation due to their poverty and deprivation.
Second, the major motivation to participate in the SG is found “to prepare for emer-
gencies” that accounts for more than 70% of the reasons of participation.  However, as 
to actual usage of loans from the SG, dealing with shocks accounts for only 24.5% of loan 
amounts.  On the other hand, nearly 40% goes for production purposes including educa-
tion.  Despite rapid economic growth in Laos in the last 10–15 years, the major concerns 
of rural people, even in Vientiane Municipality, are still “protective.”  In fact, the SHOCK 
dummy is significant in the SG participation function.  Our interpretation is that those 
households with a high propensity to be hit by shocks are more willing to participate in 
Table 13 Allocation of Lump-sum Income
(%)
Entire Sample Paddy Zone Weaving Zone
Deposit money in a Laotian bank 7.0 4.5 9.4
Deposit money in a Thai bank 0.6 0.5 0.7
Deposit money in the Savings Group 31.6 40.0 23.2
Buy gold 3.8 1.4 6.2
Buy cattle 16.6 13.4 19.7
Buy something you want 18.2 19.8 16.5
Others 22.2 20.4 24.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Prepared by authors.
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the SG.
Third, while SHOCK dummy is insignificant in the SG borrowing function, it is 
significant in the borrowing function for informal sources and partly for formal banks 
(mostly APB).  It can be interpreted that obtaining SG loans is somewhat inconvenient 
for rural people to deal with emergencies in that the SG extends loans only once in a 
month and that members cannot apply for a loan when they have already borrowed money 
from the SG.  Only after repaying all the debt, members can apply for a loan.  In contrast, 
borrowing from informal sources (in the four villages average, 62.3% are from relatives, 
18.2% from neighbors and friends, and 11.7% from money lenders) is far easier.  The 
significance of SHOCK for the borrowing function from formal banks can be explained 
by the fact that some people borrow from informal sources, and later apply for formal 
banks to repay the debt.
Fourth, generally speaking, we obtained only blurred results for the SG borrowing 
function, especially in the case of the weaving villages.  This is mainly because loans from 
the SG are spent for various purposes including emergencies and production purposes.
Fifth, however, it should be noted that the borrowing from informal sources became 
less if households participated in the SG, especially in the case of paddy villages.  It means 
that at least some of the borrowings from informal sources were substituted by the bor-
rowing from the SG.
Sixth, though rich households are more likely to be SG members, they tend to bor-
row less from the SG.  Thus, it can be claimed that SGs provide financial intermediation 
between cash-surplus rich households and cash-deficit middle and poor households.
Seventh, SGs perform differently between the paddy villages and the weaving vil-
lages.  With four sample villages, we can only propose a following hypothesis; the per-
formance of paddy villages was better because of the higher percentage of loan usage 
(from the SG) for production purposes (44.9% in the paddy zone versus 29.1% in the 
weaving zone as shown in Table 11).  In both of the weaving villages, as traders or  master 
weavers provide raw materials for weavers, financial constraints turn out to be minimized 
for weavers.  In contrast, as the borrowing function from formal banks indicates, there 
exists a strong demand for credit in the paddy villages, especially in rice cultivation.
It should be concluded, from what has been said above, that the SG carries out 
complementary functions with formal and informal financial institutions, and that the SG 
has potential for growth where growing loan demands for productive purposes are 
expected.  Otherwise, the SG stagnates as observed in Luang Prabang Province and 
partially in Natan and Phon Ngam.  This offers an answer to the research question of the 
diversified growth of the SGs in Vientiane Municipality as advanced in the introduction.
This does not imply, however, that the SG should be introduced only in the areas 
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endowed with the long-term prospects for growth of loan demands, because the SG func-
tions as an insurance institution in economically backward areas.  Distinct mechanisms 
for extending loans are required for different villages.
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